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The Present Crisis in American Bail 
Kellen Funk 
abstract.  More than fifty years after a predicted coming federal courts crisis in bail, district 
courts have begun granting major systemic injunctions against money bail systems. This Essay 
surveys the constitutional theories and circuit splits that are forming through these litigations. The 
major point of controversy is the level of federal court scrutiny triggered by allegedly unconstitu-
tional bail regimes, an inquiry complicated by ambiguous Supreme Court precedents on (1) post-
conviction fines, (2) preventive detention at the federal level, and (3) the adequacy of probable 
cause hearings. The Essay argues that the application of strict scrutiny makes the best sense of 
these precedents while also taking account of the troubled history of American bail, particularly 
during the Reconstruction Era from which the right to sue state officials in federal court for viola-
tions of constitutional rights emerged. 
introduction  
In 1965, the civil rights advocate Caleb Foote foretold a “coming constitu-
tional crisis in bail.”1 Foote was an extraordinary law professor whose research 
stemmed from the multiple prison terms he served for conscientiously objecting 
to the draft.2 To Foote, an opponent of Japanese internment in the 1940s and of 
wealth-based detention in the 1960s, the crisis in bail seemed clearly imminent. 
Given the Supreme Court’s recent solicitude for defendants’ Fourth and Sixth 
Amendment rights,3 Foote was sure that American bail regimes were about to 
 
1. Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959 (1965). 
2. Douglas Martin, Caleb Foote, Law Professor and Pacifist Organizer, Dies, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 
2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/03/us/03foote.html [https://perma.cc/9JQ9 
-QCYW]. 
3. E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires 
states to appoint attorneys to represent indigent defendants); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
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face intense pressure in the federal courts. And if the states followed a “snail-like 
pace of reform,” the federal courts would have no choice but to “force[] major 
change down the throats of the states by way of the fourteenth amendment.”4 
But the crisis as Foote foresaw it, one instigated and driven by the federal 
courts, did not come. As the Warren Court gave way to the retrenchments of the 
Burger era, strategic litigation in Florida spurred the Supreme Court to establish 
new procedural rights to prompt probable cause hearings in Gerstein v. Pugh.5 
But Pugh’s challenge against Miami’s money bail system never reached the 
Court; instead, it resulted in a Delphic pronouncement by the en banc Fifth Cir-
cuit.6 The en banc majority approved of reliance on bail schedules but indicated 
that in practice the reflexive use of schedules might fail heightened federal court 
scrutiny.7 Five separate opinions then followed, disputing each point.8 The 
Burger Court subsequently rejected an as-applied challenge to a money bail sys-
tem in O’Shea v. Littleton,9 now considered a classic case of federal-court re-
straint.10 The only time the Supreme Court has addressed bail since was in 
United States v. Salerno,11 in which the Court upheld the outright denial of bail 
under the 1984 amendments to the Federal Bail Reform Act.12 
That is not to say there has been no crisis in bail. As with mass incarceration 
generally, pretrial incarceration exploded across the law-and-order decades of 
the 1970s and 1980s.13 Estimates hold that today around sixty to seventy-five 
 
(1961) (holding that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible 
in state-court prosecutions). 
4. Foote, supra note 1, at 959. 
5. 420 U.S. 103 (1975). 
6. Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1059 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (“[T]he new Florida rule is 
not facially unconstitutional and we abstain from its further consideration.”). 
7. Id. at 1058. 
8. Id. at 1059 (Simpson, J. dissenting); id. at 1068 (Clark, J., specially concurring); id. at 1069 
(Coleman, J., specially concurring); id. at 1070 (Gee, J., specially concurring); id. at 1071 (Ru-
bin, J., concurring). 
9. 414 U.S. 488 (1974). 
10. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 227-35 (7th ed. 2015) (discussing the case at length). 
11. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
12. Id. at 741; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-50 (2018). 
13. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES 35 
(Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014) (documenting an explosion in the rate of people incarcerated 
in jails). 
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percent of all individuals in jails are unconvicted defendants awaiting trial.14 Alt-
hough it is difficult to measure with precision, undoubtedly a high proportion 
of these individuals are detained solely because they cannot afford the money-
bail amount set in their cases. Those amounts are commonly set by courts on a 
slim evidentiary record in “hearings” lasting less than two minutes.15 Money-
bail systems remain the norm in state courts across the country; they are far more 
common than systems in which judges order a defendant’s release or detention 
based on flight risk and dangerousness, such as in the (comparatively small) fed-
eral criminal system.16 Thus, the vast majority of pretrial detainees in the United 
States are confined because they cannot afford to post a bail amount set accord-
ing to a schedule or after a perfunctory hearing. This is a reality made starkly 
apparent by the widely noted recent suicides of Kalief Browder and Sandra 
Bland, both detained because of their inability to pay a relatively small money-
bail amount.17 Pretrial incarceration on this scale has drained unfathomable 
amounts of human and financial capital from already marginalized poor com-
munities and communities of color.18 
 
14. See TODD D. MINTON & ZHEN ZENG, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
NCJ 248629, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2014, at 3 (2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub
/pdf/jim14.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8C7-WH9R] (estimating that sixty percent of jail inmates 
are unconvicted). For the most up-to-date figures drawn from a variety of sources, see Peter 
Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2018, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE 
(Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2018.html [https://perma.cc
/K8FG-L6CR] (reporting that seventy-five percent of people confined in local jails have not 
been convicted). 
15. See Megan T. Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case 
Outcomes, 34 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 511, 514 & n.5 (2018). 
16. See, e.g., Pretrial Justice in America: A Survey of County Pretrial Release Policies, Practices and 
Outcomes, PRETRIAL JUST. INST. 2, 7 (2010), https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic 
/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=d4c7feb2-55be-ccd0-f06a-02802
f18eeee&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/P3P9-2UT2] (reporting that 64% of U.S. counties 
use a secured money bail schedule to determine eligibility for release prior to a first appearance 
hearing, based on a survey of 112 of the 150 most populous counties in the nation). On the 
federal system’s general aversion to monetary conditions of release, see Thomas H. Cohen, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Pretrial Release and Misconduct in Federal District Courts, 2008-2010, 
U.S. DEP’T JUST. 1, 5 (2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prmfdc0810.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V5SF-G8LQ] (showing that of the 36% of federal defendants released pre-
trial, 27% were released on a monetary condition, and only 8% used a commercial surety to 
satisfy that condition). 
17. Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, NEW YORKER (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.newyorker
.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law [https://perma.cc/9LB2-Z9U7]; Margaret Tal-
bot, Watching Sandra Bland, NEW YORKER (July 29, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com
/news/daily-comment/watching-sandra-bland [https://perma.cc/HD7M-97UM]. 
18. See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DE-
PARTMENT 47-62 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases 
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Now, five decades later, we may finally be witnessing the crisis in the federal 
courts that Foote foretold. In April 2017, Chief Judge Rosenthal of the Southern 
District of Texas enjoined the misdemeanor bail system of Harris County, 
Texas—the third-largest jail system in the nation—from engaging in wealth-
based detention.19 Injunctions echoing the opinion and order of the Harris 
County litigation have since followed elsewhere in the Fifth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits.20 Cases pursuing similar theories are pending in district court in San Fran-
cisco and New Orleans.21 State courts, too, have interpreted the Federal Consti-
tution to reach similar holdings.22 
This Essay surveys the constitutional terrain of federal court bail litigation in 
the aftermath of ODonnell v. Harris County. Now that local bail systems are under 
increased federal court scrutiny, what are the key constitutional issues emerging, 
and where might we expect the courts to go from here?23 Part I briefly explains 




19. ODonnell v. Harris County, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052 (S.D. Tex. 2017), aff’d as modified, 892 F.3d 
147 (5th Cir. 2018). 
20. Daves v. Dallas County, 341 F. Supp. 3d 688 (N.D. Tex. 2018), appeal pending, Daves v. Dallas 
County, No. 18-11368 (5th Cir. Oct. 23, 2018); Shultz v. Alabama, 330 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1365 
n.23 (N.D. Ala. 2018), appeal pending sub nom. Hester v. Gentry, No. 18-13898 (11th Cir. Sept. 
13, 2018). 
21. Buffin v. City & County of San Francisco, Civil No. 15-4959, 2018 WL 424362 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 
28, 2015); Cain v. City of New Orleans, Civil No. 15-4479 (E.D. La. Sept. 17, 2015). Recently 
the Buffin court reaffirmed its holdings on the constitutional standard to be applied. See Buffin, 
2019 WL 1017537, *13-16 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2019). 
22. In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513 (Ct. App. 2018), appeal pending, 417 P.3d 769 (Cal. 2018); 
State v. Brown, 338 P.3d 1276 (N.M. 2014); State v. Pratt, 166 A.3d 600 (Vt. 2017). The re-
mainder of this Essay focuses on federal court litigation. For a recent discussion of state court 
approaches to bail reform, see Dorothy Weldon, Note, More Appealing: Reforming Bail Review 
in State Courts, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2401 (2018). 
23. To make two things clear at the outset, this Essay is concerned with only the substantive re-
quirements of the Bill of Rights and the Reconstruction Amendments. For these purposes, I 
take for granted that a bail challenge has achieved federal court review on the merits by getting 
through the myriad procedural and jurisdictional challenges these cases often confront. That 
is no light assumption because standing, immunity, and abstention—just to name a few ju-
risdictional doctrines—present significant barriers, see, e.g., ODonnell v. Harris County, 227 F. 
Supp. 3d. 706 (S.D. Tex. 2016), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 892 F.3d 147 (ruling on the 
County’s motion to dismiss), which would require a separate volume to resolve. Second, I use 
“bail” in its colloquial sense of secured money bail—that is, a requirement for cash or collateral 
upfront to be released from pretrial detention. Bail has not always had that meaning, and for 
hundreds of years it involved no upfront transfers of money or collateral of any kind. See Tim-
othy R. Schnacke et al., The History of Bail and Pretrial Release, PRETRIAL JUST. INST. (Sept. 23, 
2010), https://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/ccjj/Committees/BailSub/Handouts/HistoryofBail-Pre-
TrialRelease-PJI_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8QM-FYS9]. 
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and procedural due process—and one ground notable for its absence, the Exces-
sive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Part II then focuses on two related 
difficulties arising in these bail challenges: the puzzling requirements of federal 
court scrutiny and the interaction between bail and probable cause standards of 
review. What is often an abstract legal debate about “tiers of scrutiny” in consti-
tutional law turns out to have dramatic consequences when bail systems are chal-
lenged in federal court. As a growing empirical literature demonstrates the cata-
strophic costs of pretrial detention on both defendants personally and on society 
at large, the key question in bail litigation—and the possibility for crisis—turns 
on the degree to which federal courts must take account of these alarming facts. 
Consonant with the troubled history of bail in our constitutional tradition, aris-
ing during the Reconstruction Era at the origins of modern civil rights review in 
the federal courts, this Essay argues that federal court scrutiny should be strict 
indeed. 
i .  constitutional grounds for challenging municipal 
money-bail systems  
A. Equal Protection 
The Fifth Circuit’s analysis of Harris County’s bail system vividly illustrates 
why detention on money bail violates the Equal Protection Clause: 
[T]ake two . . . arrestees who are identical in every way—same charge, 
same criminal backgrounds, same circumstances, etc.—except that one is 
wealthy and one is indigent . . . . One arrestee is able to post bond, and 
the other is not. As a result, the wealthy arrestee is less likely to plead 
guilty, more likely to receive a shorter sentence or be acquitted, and less 
likely to bear the social costs of incarceration. The poor arrestee, by con-
trast, must bear the brunt of all of these, simply because he has less 
money than his wealthy counterpart.24 
“But wait,” a law student cries, “I know this one! Wealth-based discrimination 
isn’t a suspect classification and triggers only rational basis review, and federal 
courts must defer to whatever rational basis the local government comes up 
with.” No doubt that is the credited answer to many a Con Law 101 exam. But 
often overlooked is the Supreme Court’s single exception in San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District v. Rodriguez, the case establishing the general rule of ra-
tional basis for wealth-based discrimination: “an absolute deprivation” of liberty 
 
24. ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 163. 
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occasioned by wealth (or indigence) triggers heightened scrutiny.25 The Court 
created this exception to take account of a line of post-conviction fines cases, a 
line that culminated (a decade after Rodriguez) in Bearden v. Georgia.26 
Bearden involved the incarceration of a convicted defendant who had failed 
to pay his fine. The Court had previously held that “the Constitution prohibits 
the State from imposing a fine as a sentence and then automatically converting 
it to a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent.”27 But what if the de-
tention was not quite automatic? How much process and inquiry must a state 
engage in before it can impose detention for failure to pay? The Bearden Court 
ruled that only if alternative measures are “not adequate . . . to meet the State’s 
interest[s] . . . may the State imprison a probationer who has made sufficient 
bona fide efforts to pay.”28 Recognizing the states’ broad penological interests, 
the Court nevertheless required “a careful inquiry” into factors like “the existence 
of alternative means” for meeting those interests.29 Only if a defendant engaged 
in bad faith (i.e., he could pay the money but refused to do so) or if there were 
no other option discovered in the course of this careful inquiry could the state 
order detention for failure to pay the fine.30 
While the Supreme Court has not applied Bearden or its other postconviction 
fine cases to the pretrial context, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have.31 And at 
least some courts are persuaded by the logic that Bearden’s rule applies “with 
special force in the bail context, where . . . arrestees are presumed innocent.”32 
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s first modern bail opinion observed that unless the 
right to pretrial liberty was carefully preserved, “the presumption of innocence, 
secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning.”33 As the Court 
 
25. 411 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1973) (emphasis added). On the doctrinal path of wealth classifications un-
der equal protection up to and through Rodriguez, see Cary Franklin, The New Class Blindness, 
128 YALE L.J. 2, 40-46 (2018). 
26. 461 U.S. 660 (1983); see also Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 
235 (1970). 
27. Tate, 401 U.S. at 398 (quoting and adopting the reasoning of Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 
508, 509 (1970)). 
28. 461 U.S. at 672. 
29. Id. at 666-67. 
30. Id. at 668-69, 672. 
31. Both circuits are bound by the former Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision in Pugh v. Rainwater, 
572 F.2d 1053, 1056-57 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc). 
32. Buffin v. City & County of San Francisco, No. 15-CV-4959-YGR, 2018 WL 424362, at *9 (N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 16, 2018); accord In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 528 (Ct. App. 2018); cf. 
ODonnell v. Harris County, 892 F.3d 147, 162 n.6 (5th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he distinction between 
post-conviction detention targeting indigents and pretrial detention targeting indigents is one 
without a difference”). 
33. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951). 
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has elsewhere recognized, a detainee “is hindered in his ability to gather evi-
dence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense,”34 another set of in-
terests that analytically seem to have greater weight pretrial than post-convic-
tion. Nevertheless, some courts apparently think that applying Bearden pretrial 
with “special force” simply means applying Bearden pretrial. The Conference of 
Chief Justices took this position in a recent amicus brief to the Fifth Circuit. The 
Conference argued that the Bearden right applies with greater force pretrial, but 
its conclusion called for a straightforward application of the Bearden rule: “a fi-
nancial condition of release that operates to detain an indigent defendant must 
be based on a finding that such condition is necessary to secure the state’s inter-
est in ensuring appearance at trial or public safety.”35 
The theory thus runs that equal protection forbids the detention of the indi-
gent (set aside for a moment how that would be defined)36 while the wealthy 
can purchase their liberty, unless the state has carefully determined that no other 
alternative could meet its interests. The state’s interests in the pretrial context 
are ensuring defendants’ appearance at future court dates37 and, as the Supreme 
Court has more recently held, protecting public safety.38 Below, I address 
whether and how often there might conceivably be no feasible alternative to se-
cured money bail. 
B. Substantive Due Process 
For centuries, courts recognized only one legitimate public purpose for set-
ting bail: assuring the defendant’s return to court.39 Under pressure from the 
rise of organized crime and law-and-order politics, Congress in 1984 amended 
the federal bail statute to require judges to consider the safety of the public, of 
alleged victims, and of potential witnesses in setting bail.40 In addition, Congress 
expanded the federal courts’ power to deny bail outright and order “preventive 
detention”: indefinite incarceration pending trial, no matter how many months 
 
34. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972). 
35. Brief of Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, ODonnell, 
892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-20333), 2017 WL 3536467, at *24, *26-27. 
36. As Andrew Hammond has recently shown, poverty determinations can be (though he argues 
they need not be) quite complicated and require an array of data collection from those invok-
ing poverty status. Andrew Hammond, Pleading Poverty in Federal Court, 128 YALE L.J. (forth-
coming 2019). 
37. Stack, 342 U.S. at 5. 
38. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987). 
39. Schnacke, supra note 23, at 2, 5-9. 
40. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150 (1984). 
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or years trial took.41 Many state and local jurisdictions followed Congress’s 
lead.42 
The test case challenging the federal bail amendment—and the only Su-
preme Court decision on bail since the 1980s—was United States v. Salerno.43 “Fat 
Tony” Salerno was probably the least sympathetic defendant to litigate constitu-
tional standards for pretrial detention. The boss of a New York mob family no-
torious for extortion, illegal gambling, and murder, Salerno was reputed to order 
hits by uttering a single word over the telephone.44 If broad segments of Ameri-
can society could agree that anyone ought to be detained pretrial without bail, it 
was Fat Tony. 
The Supreme Court upheld the federal bail act against Salerno’s facial chal-
lenge. The opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist provoked stern dissents from Jus-
tice Marshall and Justice Stevens,45 and criticism flowed from progressive quar-
ters at the time.46 Nevertheless, Salerno has more recently provided a powerful 
 
41. Of course, speedy trial rights in theory set outer limits on how long trial may take. But both 
at the state and federal levels, speedy trial rights have proven ineffective in practice. See Mal-
colm M. Feeley, How to Think About Criminal Court Reform, 98 B.U. L. REV. 673, 681 (2018); 
Shon Hopwood, The Not So Speedy Trial Act, 89 WASH. L. REV. 709, 711 (2014); Daniel Ham-
burg, Note, A Broken Clock: Fixing New York’s Speedy Trial Statute, 48 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 223 (2015); Editorial, Total Failure on Speedy Trials in New York, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/16/opinion/total-failure-on-speedy-trials-in 
-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/3AUJ-KB6Y]. 
42. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1275(a)(1) (West 2018), repealed by California Money Bail Reform 
Act, S.B. 10, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (“In setting, reducing, or denying bail, a judge 
or magistrate shall take into consideration the protection of the public . . . . The public safety 
shall be the primary consideration.”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/110-5 (West 2018) (“In 
determining the amount of monetary bail or conditions of release, if any, which will reasona-
bly assure the appearance of a defendant as required or the safety of any other person or the 
community and the likelihood of compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of bail, 
the court shall . . . take into account such matters as the nature and circumstances of the of-
fense charged, [and] whether the evidence shows that as part of the offense there was a use 
of violence or threatened use of violence . . . .”); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 316 (2019) 
(“The amount of bail shall be fixed . . . having regard to . . . [t]he nature and the seriousness 
of the danger to any other person or the community that would be posed by the defendant’s 
release.”). 
43. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
44. Daniel Richman, United States v. Salerno: The Constitutionality of Regulatory Detention, in 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 413, 422-23 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006). 
45. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 756 (1987) (Marshall, J. dissenting); id. at 768 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). 
46. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-Balancing 
Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510 (1986); Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, 
Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REV. 335, 341 n.44 (1990). 
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point of attack against money bail systems and the rampant incarceration they 
have fueled.47 
Salerno came right up to the precipice of engaging in a substantive due pro-
cess analysis without explicitly invoking those terms. Conventionally, substan-
tive due process doctrine recognizes that certain rights are so fundamental to the 
history and traditions of the United States that the Constitution protects against 
their deprivation unless rigorous requirements are first satisfied.48 Under this 
“strict scrutiny,” “the Fourteenth Amendment ‘forbids the government to in-
fringe . . . “fundamental” liberty interests at all, no matter what process is pro-
vided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state 
interest.’”49 Although never invoking substantive due process or the strict-scru-
tiny standard by name, the Salerno Court acknowledged the “fundamental na-
ture” of pretrial liberty and upheld the federal Bail Reform Act because the Court 
found it “a carefully limited exception” to the “norm” of pretrial liberty.50 
Like Bearden, Salerno suggests substantive limits that careful tailoring may 
require of a detention order or detention regime. In upholding the preventive-
detention provisions of the Federal Bail Reform Act, the Salerno Court noted that 
the regime applied only to those charged with “a specific category of extremely 
serious offenses,” whom Congress had “specifically found” to be especially dan-
gerous.51 To impose detention, moreover, the Act required a court to find, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant presented “an identified and 
articulable threat to an individual or the community” and that “no conditions of 
release [could] reasonably assure the safety of the community or any person.”52 
The Salerno Court also found several of the Bail Reform Act’s procedures 
highly relevant to its tailoring inquiry. Noting that the Act supplied detained 
defendants with (1) a hearing, (2) representation by counsel, (3) the ability to 
present evidence, (4) court findings on the record subject to a clear-and-con-
vincing evidentiary standard, and (5) a right to an expeditious appeal, the Court 
sustained the Act against Salerno’s challenge that it was facially unconstitutional 
 
47. See, e.g., In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 530-35 (Ct. App. 2018); Criminal Justice Com-
mittee Report & Recommendations: Pretrial Decision-Making Practices, TEX. JUDICIAL COUNCIL 2 
(Oct. 2016), https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1436204/criminal-justice-committee-pretrial
-recommendations-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/4W9Z-HVL4]. 
48. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997). 
49. Id. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)). 
50. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750, 755. 
51. Id. at 750. 
52. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2018)). 
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for denying the right to bail altogether.53 The Court found those procedures suf-
ficient to sustain the federal bail statute. It did not say whether those procedures 
would be necessary for state or municipal systems to pass constitutional muster. 
One federal court in Louisiana, following what we might call a strong reading of 
Salerno, has ordered declaratory relief against the Orleans Parish Magistrate 
Judge for denying defendants the procedural safeguards sustained in Salerno.54 
The judge’s appeal of that decision is pending in the Fifth Circuit. 
The other major question of Salerno’s reach beyond the federal statutory con-
text is how courts should evaluate unaffordable bail. Salerno was denied release 
on bail altogether—there was no money amount he could have paid to be re-
leased pretrial. What happens when the same kind of detention is accomplished 
by an unobtainable bail—that is, where bail is theoretically payable, but the 
amount is out of the defendant’s reach? Every circuit court to squarely address 
the question has held that, when applying the Federal Bail Reform Act, an unaf-
fordable bail is tantamount to a denial of bail altogether, and it requires the same 
procedures the Act extends to those denied bail outright.55 Arguably, these hold-
ings are only a straightforward matter of statutory construction, as the drafters 
of the federal statute were quite clear that this was their intended result.56 The 
question thus remains open whether outside the federal context, courts should 
consider any unaffordable bail to be a de facto order of pretrial detention. The 
district court in Harris County applied that standard, and other trial courts have 
since followed.57 
A strong reading of Salerno thus means that the substantive due process anal-
ysis of a money bail system ends up in much the same place as the equal protec-
tion analysis: The government must engage in sufficient process to carefully de-
termine whether there is any other alternative to detention for failure to pay bail. 
The only significant difference is that equal protection analysis turns on classifi-
cations of wealth and, therefore, might require some determination of who falls 
into an “indigence” classification.58 Because substantive due process analysis 
 
53. Id. at 750-52. 
54. Caliste v. Cantrell, 329 F. Supp. 3d 296, 311-13 (E.D. La. 2018), appeal pending, Caliste v. 
Cantrell, No. 18-30954 (5th Cir. Aug. 21, 2018). 
55. E.g., United States v. Mantecon-Zayas, 949 F.2d 548, 550 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. 
McConnell, 842 F.2d 105, 108-10 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Clark, Crim. No. 12-156 
(W.D. Mich. Nov. 20, 2012). 
56. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 16 (1983). 
57. ODonnell v. Harris County, 892 F.3d 147, 158 (5th Cir. 2018); Shultz v. Alabama, 330 F. Supp. 
3d 1344, 1358 (N.D. Ala. 2018); Caliste, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 311-12. 
58. Bearden’s majority opinion is quite clear that its rule applies only to “the indigent,” a word 
used twenty times in the opinion but nowhere defined. Bearden himself had no assets or in-
come and was unable to pay off a $500 fine. It is not clear that mere inability to pay a more 
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turns on the fundamental nature of the right involved—pretrial liberty and its 
related rights to prepare a defense and be presumed innocent pending trial59—
an unaffordable bail amount may trigger heightened procedures even if the de-
fendant is relatively wealthy. 
C. Procedural Due Process 
The unartfully named “procedural due process” analysis follows a different 
track from substantive due process. Instead of focusing on whether a right is 
fundamental and therefore requires strict scrutiny protection, courts understand 
the Due Process Clause to protect ordinary liberty and property interests by bal-
ancing the interests of the individual against those of the state. The leading case 
of Mathews v. Eldridge requires courts to consider “three distinct factors”: (1) “the 
private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the 
probable value, if any, of additional safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s in-
terest, including” its “fiscal and administrative” efficiency interests.60 
The Supreme Court has not given precise direction on which procedures may 
satisfy this test with respect to pretrial defendants. Moreover, in Turner v. Rogers, 
the Court indicated that a lack of one procedural safeguard—such as the availa-
bility of counsel—could be made up for by the presence of others, such as notice, 
the ability to present evidence, and the relative sophistication of the adversarial 
 
sizeable bail amount—say, $150,000—would render a middle-class detainee “indigent” for 
Bearden purposes. This would seem a bizarre result, but cases from the Bearden era treat “in-
digence” as a fixed category (like the federal standard for poverty), rather than a relative 
standard (like inability to pay). See, e.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 607 (1974) (“[A] state 
cannot arbitrarily cut off appeal rights for indigents while leaving open avenues of appeal for 
more affluent persons.”); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 19 (1973) 
(referring to “functional[] ‘indigen[ce]’” as “‘poor’ persons whose incomes fall below some 
identifiable level of poverty”); Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) 
(“By definition an indigent is incapable of meeting any money bail requirement.”); Pugh v. 
Rainwater, 557 F.2d 1189, 1194 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) 
(“[W]e are not called upon to decide whether any person is denied equal protection if he can 
make bail in some amount, but is unable to post the amount of bail set. We are confronted 
only with the question of the rights of indigents.”). In a footnote, the Bearden Court recog-
nized that in the context of sentencing “indigency” can be “a relative term rather than a clas-
sification,” but surmised for that reason that equal protection may not be the proper frame for 
analyzing detention based on wealth status. 461 U.S. at 666 n.8. That suggestion is difficult 
to reconcile with the narrow-tailoring approach the Court actually employed to decide the 
case. 
59. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532-33 (1972); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951). 
60. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
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parties.61 The closest the Court has come to enunciating a list of pretrial process 
protections was in Salerno, but as recounted above, the procedures reviewed in 
Salerno were mandated by the federal bail statute itself; the Court did not con-
sider whether any or all of the procedures were constitutionally required. 
Thus, while a strong reading of Salerno could lead to strict scrutiny and de-
mands that state and local governments apply the least restrictive alternative to 
pretrial detention for inability to pay bail, a weak reading of Salerno has led the 
Eleventh Circuit to conclude that local governments need only meet the Mathews 
balancing test.62 On this weak reading of Salerno, the Supreme Court’s emphasis 
on the Federal Act’s procedures was not a substantive due process tailoring anal-
ysis, but merely a procedural due process holding in the same mode of analysis 
as Mathews. Nevertheless, some federal courts, including the Fifth Circuit, have 
found common bail systems to fail even the Mathews test because they provide 
insufficient notice, opportunity to present evidence and be heard, and judicial 
consideration of evidence on the record.63 Considering the high costs of pretrial 
incarceration and the significant risk that incarceration imposes an unnecessary 
deprivation of liberty, even the relatively slight burdens of the Mathews test may 
pose a significant challenge to typical bail systems. 
What is not required under procedural due process is a substantive finding 
that no alternative to detention is available to satisfy the state’s pretrial interests. 
If only procedural due process is in view, a jurisdiction could in theory continue 
to jail three-quarters of its pretrial population on the basis of wealth, so long as 
timely hearings and nominal consideration of evidence is provided.64 For this 
reason, civil rights litigants tend to emphasize equal protection or substantive 
due process and their requirements of substantive scrutiny, while federal courts 
leery of engaging in substantive review seem more willing to stop short at only 
a procedural due process analysis. 
Such courts, however, have been less than clear about the respective roles 
equal protection, substantive due process, and procedural due process play in 
their analysis. For example, in paring back the district court’s injunction in Har-
ris County to a purely procedural order, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the in-
junction “makes some sense if one assumes a fundamental substantive due pro-
cess right to be free from any form of wealth-based detention. But, as the 
 
61. 564 U.S. 431, 444-46 (2011). 
62. Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2018). 
63. ODonnell v. Harris County, 892 F.3d 147, 158-59 (5th Cir. 2018). 
64. See ODonnell v. Goodhart, 900 F.3d 220, 227, 228 (5th Cir. 2018) (reasoning, as a panel decid-
ing a motion to stay the district court’s revised injunction following remand, that, under pro-
cedural due process, “a procedural violation is subject [only] to procedural relief” and that 
“[d]etention of indigent arrestees and release of wealthier ones is not constitutionally infirm 
purely because” indigent defendants are detained longer than wealthier ones). 
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foregoing analysis establishes, no such right is in view. The sweeping injunction 
is overbroad.”65 Yet the district court had reasoned from equal protection, not 
substantive due process.66 Most importantly, since the Fifth Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s equal protection holding in the same opinion, a substantive rather 
than purely procedural remedy was clearly appropriate.67 
D. Excessive Bail 
In all the recent challenges, the bell that largely hasn’t rung is the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on “excessive bail.” In the 1951 case Stack v. Boyle, the 
Supreme Court’s first major opinion interpreting that clause, the Court held that 
“excessive” meant only that “bail [had been] set at a figure higher than an 
amount reasonably calculated” to ensure the defendant’s presence at trial.68 As 
noted above, the Court later added public safety as a legitimate state interest in 
the setting of bail,69 but the effect remains the same: excessiveness is understood 
in relation to the state’s goals, not in relation to what the defendant can afford 
or the consequences of an amount set beyond the defendant’s means. Judges 
enjoy broad discretion to determine what amount satisfies the state’s goals, and 
following Stack, federal courts have routinely held that “bail is not excessive un-
der the Eighth Amendment merely because it is unaffordable.”70 
 
65. ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 163. 
66. ODonnell v. Harris County, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1147 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (“[T]he court’s con-
clusions do not rely on substantive due process.”); id. at 1147-53 (finding a likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits of plaintiffs’ equal protection claim). Thus, the Fifth Circuit did not con-
sider the requirements of substantive due process either. Instead, the Fifth Circuit analyzed 
Harris County’s bail regime under procedural due process. Further still, in the procedural 
analysis it only considered the state-created liberty interest generated by Texas state law on 
pretrial release, not the “fundamental” constitutional right to liberty that Salerno could be read 
to proclaim. Thus, substantive due process was left completely out of the Fifth Circuit’s “fore-
going analysis.” See ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 157-61. 
67. See ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 163; cf. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 220 (1990) (“[The] 
substantive issue involves a definition of th[e] protected constitutional interest, as well as 
identification of the conditions under which competing state interests might outweigh it. The 
procedural issue concerns the minimum procedures required by the Constitution for deter-
mining that the individual’s liberty interest actually is outweighed in a particular instance.” 
(quotation omitted)). In a forthcoming paper, Brandon L. Garrett criticizes the Fifth Circuit’s 
merely procedural remedy on the same ground. See Brandon L. Garrett, Wealth, Equal Protec-
tion, and Due Process, WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 21), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3313358. 
68. 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951). 
69. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987). 
70. E.g., Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1258 (11th Cir. 2018). 
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That does not mean that an Eighth Amendment challenge against common 
municipal bail systems would be doomed to fail. Recent scholarship by Beth 
Colgan on the Excessive Fines Clause convincingly demonstrates that the origi-
nal public meaning of “excessive” directly related to the defendant’s means and 
to the consequences that would follow if a defendant could not pay a fine.71 Col-
gan’s historical work and arguments could inform the interpretation of the Ex-
cessive Bail Clause since, as the Court recently noted, the two clauses “place par-
allel limitations on the power of those entrusted with the criminal-law function 
of government.”72 
* * * 
To summarize, a line of Supreme Court cases about postconviction fines ap-
pears ready-made to challenge pretrial bail regimes on equal protection grounds. 
Applying that line would forbid detaining the indigent when the wealthy could 
go free unless the state could find no other alternative to assure the presence of 
the defendant at trial or to protect public safety. Meanwhile, the Supreme 
Court’s due process review of the federal bail statute seems instructive—though 
courts are currently divided as to what that instruction is. On a strong reading, 
the Constitution protects the fundamental right of pretrial liberty unless the 
state can, as required under equal protection, show that there is no alternative to 
detention available to meet its interests. On a weak reading, the Constitution 
protects pretrial liberty with certain (as yet undefined) procedures, but if the 
state offers those procedures, courts may not have to rigorously inquire into 
whether alternatives to detention are available to meet the state’s interest. Under 
Salerno, those procedures may include an adversary hearing, findings on the rec-
ord by a clear-and-convincing standard, and a right of expeditious appeal. 
 
71. Beth Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277 (2014). 
72. Timbs v. Indiana, No. 17-1091, slip op. at 3 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2019) (majority opinion) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). Even if Stack remains the dominant interpretation of 
“excessive” bail, the test for evaluating whether a bail amount is disproportionate to meeting 
the state’s interests may well turn out to be functionally the same analysis as the due process 
or equal protection inquiry. For instance, the Sixth Circuit, in Fields v. Henry County, 701 F.3d 
180 (6th Cir. 2012), indicated that bail may be “excessive” if (1) the bail set is “grossly dispro-
portional to the gravity” of a charged offense, id. at 184 (quoting United States v. Bajakajian, 
524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998)); (2) the evidence produced at a bail hearing “was too weak to justify 
the amount,” id. at 185 (citing United States v. Leisure, 710 F.2d 422, 428 (8th Cir. 1983)); or 
(3) the bail “was much higher than normal for such charges or . . . the judge relied upon im-
permissible factors,” id. (citing Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 213 (1st Cir. 1987)). Taken 
together, such factors tend to mimic a tailoring standard similar to heightened scrutiny, espe-
cially if a court were to inform its sense of proportionality based on recent empirical work on 
the relative ineffectiveness of money bail at meeting the state interests at stake. See infra notes 
81-89 and accompanying text. That is, the Eighth Amendment is not meaningless under 
Stack; it just may not have much independent meaning beyond what the other clauses already 
require, substantively and procedurally. 
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To be sure, this survey does not exhaust potential theories for how the Fed-
eral Constitution may govern the municipal regulation of bail. The Supreme 
Court has, for instance, applied due process and equal protection principles ex-
pansively in cases that Judith Resnik characterizes as involving “[a]symmetrical 
power and high stakes,” such as when striking down filing fees to access divorce 
proceedings in Boddie v. Connecticut.73 Perhaps even more surprising than the 
absence of the Eighth Amendment in recent bail challenges is the absence of ra-
cial discrimination claims, given the wildly disproportionate impact of mass pre-
trial detention on communities of color.74 This survey, however, focuses on the 
arguments litigants are making in federal courts, which are necessarily more lim-
ited in imaginative range. So long as the Court disfavors racial discrimination 
claims based on disparate impact without ironclad proof of intentional animus,75 
litigators have steered their arguments towards the more favorable precedents 
on discrimination based on wealth and class. The Supreme Court has largely 
foreclosed the use of statistical evidence to establish racial discrimination,76 
while statistics on wealth discrimination have managed to have more sway in 
federal courts so far.77 
Applying equal protection and due process standards in recent challenges to 
state and municipal bail systems has raised two particularly thorny issues. How 
those issues are ultimately resolved in the federal courts will dramatically affect 
the trend of modern bail reform and will largely determine whether or not bail 
reformers can continue to proceed in federal court challenges. 
 
73. 401 U.S. 371 (1971); see Judith Resnik, Courts and Economic and Social Rights/Courts as Eco-
nomic and Social Rights, in THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 259, 277 (Katharine 
G. Young ed., forthcoming 2019). 
74. See, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund in Support of 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, ODonnell v. Harris County, Civil No. 16-1414 
(S.D. Tex. 2017) (“African Americans make up 18% of Harris County’s adult population, but 
account for 48% of the adult prison population in Harris County.”). 
75. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
76. See Reva B. Siegel, Blind Justice: Why the Court Refused to Accept Statistical Evidence of Discrim-
inatory Purpose in McCleskey v. Kemp—and Some Pathways for Change, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1269 
(2018). 
77. See infra Section II.A (discussing federal courts’ consideration of statistical evidence in the 
Harris County case). 
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i i .  the central difficulty:  a crisis  of scrutiny 
A. Federal Court Scrutiny 
The first puzzle is what level of scrutiny federal courts must use to review 
challenges to state and local bail systems, since the standard is far from clear in 
the case law. By this point, the general reader may be getting frustrated. Levels 
of review have not been a fashionable academic topic for some time.78 After all, 
what practical difference does any of this make? When do we actually start talk-
ing about the substantive justice of pretrial incarceration? 
To answer, we must turn away from the cases for a moment and consider 
both a truly astounding literature on pretrial bail and detention emerging in the 
social sciences and impressively broad-based social movements to reform bail. 
In the last half-decade, an unprecedented number of rigorously controlled, sci-
entific analyses of pretrial bail systems have appeared in both social science jour-
nals and law reviews (in fact, the Yale Law Journal has published three articles on 
the implications of this research for pretrial detention in recent years).79 
Taken together, this literature helps to quantify just how devastating pretrial 
detention is for defendants. Controlling for relevant factors, detained misde-
meanor defendants in Harris County, for instance, are twenty-five percent more 
likely to be convicted and forty-three percent more likely to be sentenced to jail 
than their counterparts who were released pretrial.80 Detained defendants are 
more likely to lose jobs, apartments, and child custody, and some studies have 
suggested that pretrial detention is itself substantially criminogenic.81 Im-
portantly, the research indicates that all of these adverse effects are triggered by 
as little as two or three days of detention.82 
 
78. But see Emma Kauffman, Segregation by Citizenship, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1379 (2019) (document-
ing the rise of the all-foreign prison and arguing that federal penal segregation by citizenship 
status should trigger strict scrutiny). 
79. Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2019); Sandra G. Mayson, 
Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490 (2018); Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and 
the Right to Be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344 (2014). 
80. Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. 
L. REV. 711, 741-59, 787 (2017). 
81. Will Dobbie et al., The Effects of Pre-Trial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and Employ-
ment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 201, 224-26 (2018); Heaton 
et al., supra note 80, at 718; see also id. at 760 (considering possible causes of pretrial deten-
tion’s criminogenic effect). 
82. CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP ET AL., LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., THE HIDDEN COSTS OF 
PRETRIAL DETENTION 10-11 (2013). 
the yale law journal forum April 22, 2019 
1114 
Moreover, recent work on the operation of incentives in the pretrial phase 
indicates that these costs are not only devastating but unnecessary. Charitable 
bail funds—which demand no cash from and therefore impose no financial in-
centives on their bailees—have achieved promising appearance rates with little 
more than low-cost text-message reminders and transportation subsidies.83 
Other empirical work shows that risks of dangerousness and flight can be suc-
cessfully managed at significantly lower cost than pretrial incarceration.84 
Here, then, is the fundamental crisis of bail: If these studies make their way 
into the factual record of a federal court applying a searching level of review, the 
most common American bail systems, which casually impose detention for fail-
ure to put up secured money, are almost certain to fall. The common assumption 
that secured money bail incentivizes appearance in some way that other public 
assistance or sanctions could not completely collapses under their weight.85 Alt-
hough municipalities have employed these systems for decades all across the 
country, no federal court that has reached the merits under heightened scrutiny 
has yet sustained these systems against challenges demanding extensive remedi-
ation by the trial courts. 
Harris County is the model case here. In an extensive opinion—193 pages as 
docketed—Judge Rosenthal reviewed not only the secondary literature discussed 
 
83. Jason Tashea, Text-Message Reminders Are a Cheap and Effective Way to Reduce Pretrial Detention, 
A.B.A. J. (July 17, 2018, 7:10 AM CDT), http://www.abajournal.com/lawscribbler/article
/text_messages_can_keep_people_out_of_jail [https://perma.cc/A3FP-GY6B]; see also PRE-
TRIAL SERVS. AGENCY FOR D.C., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION AND PERFORMANCE 
BUDGET REQUEST, FY 2019, at 27 (2018). As Jocelyn Simonson has argued, charitable bail 
funds not only call into question the incentive argument, but also suggest reconceiving the 
social costs weighed in a pretrial detention decision. Instead of assuming that the public’s 
interest is secured only by pretrial detention, community bail funds show the public interest in 
release and restoration of defendants to jobs and homes. Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 
115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 612-21 (2017); see also Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 
92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399, 1417-29 (2017) (arguing that in a cost-benefit analysis of pretrial de-
tention, various community interests are a cost of pretrial detention). 
84. Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 528-29 (2012); 
Lauryn P. Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 729-35 (2018). 
85. Arpit Gupta, Christopher Hansman & Ethan Frenchman, The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evi-
dence from Judge Randomization, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 471, 476 (2016); Michael R. Jones, Unse-
cured Bonds: The As Effective and Most Efficient Pretrial Release Option, PRETRIAL J. INST. (Oct. 
2013). See also the recently released study of Philadelphia’s reduction in cash-bail require-
ments since District Attorney Larry Krasner instituted an office policy against requesting bail 
for a range of offenses. Aurelie Ouss & Megan T. Stevenson, Evaluating the Impacts of Elimi-
nating Prosecutorial Requests for Cash Bail 1 (George Mason Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
LS 19-08, Feb. 17, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3335138 (finding that the percentage of 
defendants released on their own recognizance—rather than on monetary or other condi-
tions—increased by twelve points following the policy while appearance rates remained sta-
ble). 
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above, but also made-to-order studies conducted by expert sociologists and data 
scientists retained by the parties. She concluded that “release on secured financial 
conditions does not assure better rates of appearance or of law-abiding conduct 
before trial compared to release on unsecured bonds or nonfinancial conditions 
of supervision.”86 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s factual find-
ings,87 and other courts are now relying on those findings as they scrutinize other 
municipal bail systems.88 
Judge Rosenthal’s opinion also scrutinized the record of recent bail reform 
occurring across the country, most of it in response to social and political move-
ments marshalling constitutional arguments not in federal court cases but in lo-
cal legislatures and other rulemaking bodies.89 The court considered, for in-
stance, statutory changes prioritizing release and procedurally protected and 
transparent detention orders over money bail in Washington, D.C., New Mex-
ico, and New Jersey, as well as court administrative rules forbidding pretrial de-
tention based solely on indigence in Maryland and New Orleans.90 If the deci-
sion were written today, it could have listed even more jurisdictions with recent 
significant political change, including Atlanta, Chicago, and California.91 
Although it carefully stressed that “it is not a federal court’s role in any way 
to make policy judgments,” the district court in Harris County noted that there 
is a “clear and growing movement” toward questioning historical bail practices 
on constitutional—and not just political—grounds.92 The court observed that re-
forming jurisdictions broadly divided into two camps93: those that anchored 
their reforms in the constitutional logic of the American Bar Association’s Stand-
ards for Pretrial Release, which argues that bail “must be within the reach of the 
defendant”94 and those that tracked the reasoning of the Obama-era Department 
 
86. ODonnell v. Harris County, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1118 (S.D. Tex. 2017). 
87. ODonnell v. Harris County, 892 F.3d 147, 162-63 (5th Cir. 2018). 
88. E.g., Shultz v. State, 330 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1367-68 (N.D. Ala. 2018); Daves v. Dallas County, 
341 F. Supp. 3d 688, 696-97 (N.D. Tex. 2018). 
89. ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1078-84. 
90. See id. 
91. See S.B. 10, 2017-2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); Atlanta, Ga., Ordinance 18-O-1045 (Feb. 5, 
2018), http://citycouncil.atlantaga.gov/Home/ShowDocument?id=983 [https://perma.cc
/J9Y9-56QW]; Cook County, Ill., Gen. Order No. 18.8A(Ill. Cir. Ct. July 17, 2017), http://
www.cookcountycourt.org/Portals/0/Orders/General%20Order%20No.%2018.8a.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NS8M-AKGP]. 
92. ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1084. 
93. Id. at 1083-84. 
94. Id. at 1083; ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PRETRIAL RELEASE, Standard 10-1.4 (AM. 
BAR ASS’N, 3d ed. 2007). 
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of Justice,95 which argued that unaffordable bail is permissible only when a court 
finds that release on any other conditions would not reasonably assure the indi-
vidual’s appearance. The constitutional pronouncements of the ABA, the De-
partment of Justice, and state supreme courts and legislatures helped supply the 
case law, so to speak, that never developed as Foote and other reformers expected 
over the last five decades. The recognition in a federal court that social and po-
litical movements toward bail reform are relevant to constitutional analysis 
opens up room for other judges (and advocates) to also draw on political change 
in their constitutional analysis.96 It also makes it easier for courts to forge new 
constitutional understandings in the face of decades of Supreme Court silence 
on the issue. In short, social movements fuel the current crisis of bail as much as 
the empirical studies. 
Some courts appear reluctant to find that such a widespread and longstand-
ing system of practice could have been unconstitutional and in need of the kind 
of strict federal court supervision required in, for instance, the desegregation 
cases. But given the factual findings of the federal trial courts and the widely 
accepted and broadly mobilized studies on which they rely, there is very little 
ground on which to sustain common municipal bail systems on the merits—
unless the federal courts cannot develop these records in the first place. This is 
why, going forward, the standard of scrutiny will be critically important. The 
Supreme Court declined the opportunity to take up the question this term.97 
Whether or not it addresses these issues soon, it will have to do so in the years 
ahead. A $2 billion commercial bail-bond industry and the federal supervision 
of a thousand local regimes depend on it. 
 
95. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee and Urging Affir-
mance on the Issue Addressed Herein, Walker v. City of Calhoun, 682 Fed. Appx. 721 (11th 
Cir. 2017), 2016 WL 4417421. 
96. The story of recent social movements towards bail reform has yet to be told. For a partial list 
of what organizers, lawyers, faith leaders, and academics have recently accomplished to dis-
mantle pre- and post-trial incarceration, see Alec Karakatsanis, The Punishment Bureaucracy: 
How to Think About “Criminal Justice Reform,” 128 YALE L.J.F. 848, 932-35 (2019). For various 
articulations of how social and political mobilization can inform constitutional jurisprudence, 
see Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the Constitution: The Case 
of the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27 (2005); Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Chang-
ing the Wind: Notes Towards a Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740 
(2014); Martha Minow, Law and Social Change, 62 UMKC L. REV. 171 (1993); Reva B. Siegel, 
Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De 
Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006). 
97. See Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, Walker, No. 18-814 
(U.S. Apr. 1, 2019). 
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* * * 
As noted above, the Eleventh Circuit has read Salerno as requiring only a 
procedural due process balancing of state and individual interests and therefore 
does not demand particularly rigorous procedural protections.98 On the other 
hand, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, is adamant that Salerno requires strict 
scrutiny of pretrial detention regimes.99 The Supreme Court itself has given 
some indication that it views Salerno as among its strict-scrutiny cases,100 but it 
has not definitively ruled so. 
The Court has been even more circumspect about the equal protection anal-
ysis in Bearden. Although the parties in Bearden debated strict scrutiny in their 
briefing,101 the Bearden Court refused to declare a level of review, rejecting what 
it called a “resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis.”102 The Court noted 
that in its precedents on wealth-based detention, “[d]ue process and equal pro-
tection principles converge in the Court’s analysis,” and it largely left the matter 
there.103 By focusing on wealth classifications and by demanding that the state 
use the least restrictive alternative available to meet its interests, Bearden seems 
to have functionally applied strict scrutiny while adamantly refusing to say so. 
Accordingly, lower federal courts have come out all over on the question of 
scrutiny. Some have applied “heightened” scrutiny while attempting to dodge 
specifying how that differs from strict scrutiny.104 A district court in California, 
and now the Eleventh Circuit, found that Bearden requires only rational basis 
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review of bail systems.105 The district court in Harris County applied “interme-
diate scrutiny,” which has the advantage of compromise, applying heightened 
(but not the highest) scrutiny. Nevertheless, the choice is somewhat awkward 
since intermediate scrutiny to this point has only applied to gender discrimina-
tion and certain free speech claims.106 In affirming the Harris County order, the 
Fifth Circuit ruled only that the application of intermediate scrutiny “was not in 
error,” given that the en banc Fifth Circuit had previously applied the Bearden 
predecessor cases to pretrial detention.107 Thus, the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits 
have divided over the question of scrutiny under Salerno, while the Fifth and 
Eleventh have divided over the question of scrutiny under Bearden.108 
There are a number of good reasons to conclude that strict, or at least height-
ened scrutiny, makes the best sense of the Supreme Court’s precedents. If height-
ened scrutiny, narrow tailoring, and a substantive finding of necessity protect 
convicted indigent defendants, they surely ought to apply in the pretrial context, 
where the presumption of innocence and a defendant’s ability to prepare for trial 
are most vulnerable.109 If Congress’s bail statute was constitutional because it 
“careful[ly] delineat[ed]” the circumstances in which detention was authorized, 
and these were limited to cases involving “extremely serious offenses,”110 mu-
nicipal systems that detain forty percent of misdemeanor defendants until the 
termination of their proceedings—as Harris County did—should at a minimum 
be subjected to heightened review.111 
The trial court in Harris County hinted that there may be another good rea-
son to read the Supreme Court’s precedents in favor of searching review of mu-
nicipal bail systems in the federal courts. In its conclusion on Harris County’s 
motion to dismiss, the court recalled the 1871 origins of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.112 Now 
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111. See ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1105. 
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the main vehicle for litigating violations of constitutional rights by state actors, 
§ 1983 arose from the Reconstruction Congress’s effort “to enforce provisions of 
the Fourteenth Amendment against those who carry a badge of authority of a 
State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their 
authority or misuse it.”113 The federal district court applied this history by cut-
ting through the myriad procedural and jurisdictional challenges raised by the 
defendant county, reasoning that although 
[m]ultiple and overlapping authorities may contribute to a policy of 
denying freedom from pretrial detention to those accused in misde-
meanor cases solely because they are too poor to pay a bail bond, . . . the 
existence of multiple and overlapping authorities cannot, on its own, 
shield officers or official bodies from liability.114 
Indeed, the Reconstruction Era origins of modern civil rights law may likewise 
counsel strict scrutiny and a substantive finding of necessity before defendants 
can be jailed for inability to pay bail. 
The need for federal oversight of state and municipal bail regimes was a crit-
ical spur—perhaps the critical spur—to the passage of the Reconstruction 
Amendments, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 
(now more familiar to us as 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Legal historians often overlook 
the role of bail in southern resistance to Reconstruction. A full account lies be-
yond the scope of this Essay, but a couple of examples can illustrate the key point. 
The black codes’ infamous ban on African American ownership of firearms, for 
instance, was enforced by holding violators “in default of bail,” or under preven-
tive detention as we would now call it.115 The economic historian Jennifer 
Roback notes that bail was crucial to the debt peonage system erected by the 
southern black codes.116 Former masters would stand surety to freedmen incar-
cerated on manufactured criminal charges. Freedmen were then bound by the 
black codes to work off their bail debt in service to their former masters.117 The 
South’s postbellum attempt to reinstitute slavery, working hand in hand with its 
reinscription of racial hierarchy, was thus primarily a function of bail law. 
In countermanding the black codes and empowering federal courts to guard 
against their reinstitution, the Reconstruction Congress was centrally concerned 
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with federal scrutiny of state practices, both written and unwritten.118 These of 
course included practices of bailing or detaining freedmen.119 Anthony Amster-
dam argues that, properly understood in context, the major Reconstruction acts 
were meant to grant freedmen broad rights of removal to federal court in order 
to bring as-applied challenges to the unequal enforcement of state criminal law, 
including discriminatory pretrial proceedings.120 From 1880 to the turn of the 
century, the Supreme Court eroded the power of removal in state criminal pro-
ceedings.121 Nevertheless, the centrality of bail to the Reconstruction legacy, in-
cluding our modern § 1983, ought to stand for something more than federal court 
deference to any proposed rationality of unequal bail regimes that afford mini-
mal process to defendants. One key way to uphold this legacy is to read the Su-
preme Court’s precedents in Bearden and Salerno straightforwardly to require 
heightened federal court review of allegedly unequal and arbitrary municipal bail 
regimes. 
B. Probable Cause 
A final difficulty lies in figuring out where probable cause properly fits into 
the system of pretrial arrest and bail, or more succinctly, what the Fourth 
Amendment has to do with the Fourteenth. In Gerstein, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the Fourth Amendment requires that a defendant arrested without a war-
rant appear before a neutral magistrate for a finding of probable cause 
“promptly” after arrest.122 A later case defined promptness as within forty-eight 
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hours after arrest.123 The Gerstein Court ruled that these hearings did not require 
representation by counsel under the slight procedural requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment. In a separate passage, the Court encouraged states to ex-
periment with how they fulfilled their various constitutional obligations before 
trial, noting that states could choose to combine the probable-cause hearing with 
other preliminary matters, such as the setting of bail.124 The difficult question is 
whether the Supreme Court foreclosed the application of heightened scrutiny to 
pretrial detention by substituting only Fourth Amendment protections instead. 
Gerstein is open to two entirely different readings. Gerstein could be read to 
say that only minimal process flows from the Fourth Amendment right against 
unreasonable seizure, because other rights are protected by other requirements, in-
cluding due process and equal protection. After all, the Court majority in re-
sponse to the dissent considered the finding of probable cause “a threshold right” 
and noted it was “in fact only the first stage of an elaborate system, unique in 
jurisprudence, designed to safeguard the rights of those accused of criminal con-
duct.”125 On this reading, a probable-cause determination may be combined 
with bail setting or any other proceeding, but only if those proceedings continue 
to satisfy the heighted requirements the Constitution places on them, not the 
lower “threshold” standards of probable cause. For instance, a jurisdiction that 
combined the finding of probable cause with an actual arraignment would surely 
have to provide counsel, since the Court has long considered arraignment a “crit-
ical stage” of criminal proceedings.126 
But there is another possible reading of Gerstein. Several times in its decision 
the Court incautiously switched from speaking about probable cause for the arrest 
to probable cause for the detention without considering whether different stand-
ards ought to apply in the days and weeks after an arrest. Even as it declared the 
Fourth Amendment only a “threshold right,” the Court implied that this thresh-
old right might govern the balance of interests between the state and the indi-
vidual through the entire pretrial phase, “including the detention of suspects 
pending trial.”127 Just two terms ago, the Court declared, citing Gerstein, that 
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“[t]he Fourth Amendment . . . establishes the standards and procedures govern-
ing pretrial detention.”128 In that case, Justice Kagan’s opinion for the Court ex-
panded a right of action by a defendant arrested on false pretenses. It would be a 
perverse result to read the statement as a retraction of pretrial due process down 
to the minimal standards of the probable cause hearing, but that reading is at 
least theoretically available. 
Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has adopted just that reading. Viewing Salerno 
and Bearden through the lens of Gerstein, rather than the other way around, the 
Eleventh Circuit panel decided that, at least for the first forty-eight hours after 
arrest, pretrial detention regimes are subject only to rational basis review, and 
that review is presumptively satisfied if the regime meets the minimal standards 
of the Fourth Amendment.129 The panel ruled that the Equal Protection Clause 
had no independent force in such a case, because detention within the first forty-
eight hours after arrest was not an “absolute deprivation” of liberty such that the 
heightened standards of Rodriguez and Bearden would apply.130 
The Eleventh Circuit’s reading of Gerstein may be plausible, but Gerstein’s 
post-arrest procedures scarcely provide a proper assessment for a detention that 
may last months or years. The Gerstein Court said little directly about duration, 
yet it did seem to imagine that the standards it was announcing were to apply to 
a relatively short period of post-arrest confinement—or as the Court put it, “a 
brief period of detention to take the administrative steps incident to arrest.”131 
And although it may seem intuitive that only limited due process can be provided 
in the hours after arrest as the state conducts its initial investigation, a categorical 
rule limiting due process during the first forty-eight hours after all arrests is 
overbroad.132 Salerno indicated that pretrial detention should be limited to “ex-
tremely serious offenses,” a substantive limitation that can be applied immedi-
ately upon arrest and determination of the charge.133 In fact, in practice, most 
regimes identify the charge and release a defendant within minutes, hours, or at 
most a day if the defendant can pay a prescheduled bail amount.134 The practical 
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reality that many wealthy defendants are able to bail out so promptly suggests 
that the state’s interest in administrative detention cannot be so high as to defeat 
equal protection challenges, even those challenging brief or early periods of post-
arrest detention. After all, the adverse consequences of discriminatory pretrial 
detention—including its criminogenic effects—begin to mount as soon as the 
second day of detention.135 
The Eleventh Circuit’s crabbed reading of Gerstein has been replicated by a 
Fifth Circuit motions panel.136 Yet while some federal courts may be willing to 
dodge the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment by looking only at the 
Fourth, the Eleventh Circuit’s reading of Rodriguez is completely untenable. The 
“absolute” quality of a liberty deprivation cannot turn on temporality. If it did, 
only life imprisonment without parole would constitute an absolute deprivation 
of liberty; yet that was clearly not what the Court had in mind in Rodriguez or in 
its post-conviction fine cases, all of which involved imprisonment of limited du-
ration. Rather, as the Court has long held in its habeas jurisprudence, “absolute” 
turns on the degree of confinement, and incarceration in a jail is the absolute 
height of depriving a person of bodily liberty.137 In sum, despite the Supreme 
Court’s inattentive generalizations implying that only the Fourth Amendment 
governs pretrial detention, federal courts must continue to apply the full range 
of constitutional protections to their review of state and municipal detention re-
gimes, as in fact the Court itself did in both Bearden (when evaluating a proba-
tioner’s arrest and detention under equal protection and due process) and Sa-
lerno (when evaluating a defendant’s pretrial detention under due process and 
the Eighth Amendment). 
conclusion 
Where may the present crisis end? As the devastation of mass pretrial incar-
ceration increasingly works its way into the public record, the federal courts find 
themselves at the head of a path that could lead to federal court supervision of 
municipal regimes that is every bit as extensive and disruptive as the desegrega-
tion dockets after Brown v. Board of Education.138 Whether the courts will rise to 
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meet this crisis and carry out their role as guardians of equal protection and due 
process against local oppression of the most politically powerless classes is per-
haps doubtful.139 Already, appellate courts are finding ways to look past the 
mounting evidence of rampant inequality and human rights violations in pretrial 
incarceration in the name of “flexibility and experimentation” and “deference to 
the demands of federalism.”140 
But the crisis touched off in Harris County may find another template for its 
resolution there. In the wake of the federal court injunction, a slate of political 
challengers campaigned against the defendant judges on a platform of settling 
the federal case and reforming the misdemeanor bail system. In November 2018, 
the challengers won across the board.141 In January 2018, the new defendants 
dropped all further appeals and reformed their system legislatively.142 Harris 
County had paid elite national law firms over nine million dollars to defend the 
bail suit.143 Ultimately that money bought the county nothing more than a slight 
reprieve until election day. 
A number of federal appellate courts will soon face the present crisis “‘twixt 
old systems and the Word.”144 They must respond by enforcing clear constitu-
tional boundaries on local discretion without reference to docket pressures or an 
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undue regard for federalism. If the Reconstruction-era landmark § 1983 doesn’t 
give federal courts power to supervise and, if necessary, disrupt the jailing of 
impoverished minorities based on mere accusations, one of the key purposes for 
erecting the modern federal courts system will be thwarted.145 But if the federal 
appellate courts disappoint, the fact that the lower courts have succeeded in 
reaching the constitutional merits against America’s modern money bail system 
has already blazed a trail toward building political power at the local level, even 
in the most recalcitrant of municipalities. 
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